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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WARD C. HOLBROOK, and
MABEL F. HOLBROOK, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
WEBSTER'S, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant,
ELVIN COON, et ux and et al.
Defendants,
and
LEONARD A. TRIMBLE and
ALICE TRIMBLE, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 8724

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

Respondents agree with the statement of facts as recited
by appellant with the exception that Elvin Coon was owner
wherein appellant refers to Coon as builder. Respondents
Trimble, in open court, without objection by appellant, joined
in Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and counsel
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for appellant orally stipulated that no objection would be
raised to such joinder.
The motion for summary judgment was based upon
two grounds: ( l) The appellant failed to file its lien within
the statutory period of eighty days, and (2) Appellant is
estopped from asserting its lien, having signed a written
waiver. It is the contention of respondents that each of
said grounds supports the judgment.

I
LIEN NOT FILED WITHIN STATUTORY PERIOD
It is conceded that appellant's lien was not filed within
80 days after the furnishing of the last materials by this
claimant, but the lien was filed 83 days after the last delivery. The fact that Coon who built the house was the fee
owner who executed the notes and mortgages and contracted
with the materialmen for the furnishing of materials is uncontraverted. The legislature of the State of Utah has defined Contractors and Subcontractors under Section 38-l-2
UCA 1953 as follows:
"Whosoever shall do work or furnish materials
by contract, express or implied, with the owner, as in
this chapter provided, shall be deemed an original contractor, and all other persons doing work or furnishing
materials shall be deemed subcontractors."
(a) ONE DEALING WITH OWNER IS ORIGINAL
CONTRACTOR
Appellant in its lien recognized Coon as the owner
by characterizing Coon as "Contractor AND Owner". The
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The statutory definition controls over the public concept of
what a contractor is. The mere fact that a builder of houses
is generally referred to as a "contractor" should have no
effect to supersede the statutory definition of what is meant
by "contractor" under the particular mechanics lien statute
in Utah.
The following cases support this proposition.
Jordan vs. Natrona Lumber Company, -----------Wyo. ____________ , 75 Pac. (2d) 378, 385,
wherein the court said:
"In Ambrose Mfg. Co. v Gapen, 22 Mo. Appl. 397,
the Court said:
'It is contended by appellants that the term original contractor, as used in the statute, has reference
solely to those who may do service, by way of work,
labor, or superintendence, upon the building.
'The point is not well taken. It has been specially
ruled by our Supreme Court, that a material man may
be an original contractor, and that he is, in fact, such
contractor, if he furnished the material on a contract
with the owner. Hearne v Ry. Co. 53 Mo. 324.'
"Courts in other jurisdictions having similar words
to construe have taken the same view as that announced
by the foregoing decisions. See Morris v. Bessemer
Lumber Co., 217 Ala. 441, 116 So. 528; Gray v. N.M.
Pumice Stone Co., 15 N.M. 478, 110 P. 603. And in
Freidenhloom v. Pecos Valley Lumber Co., 35 N.M.
154, 290 P. 797, 798, the court, discussing who may
be regarded as 'owner' and 'original contractor' within
the meaning of those words in the mechanics' lien law
of that state, said that the word 'owner' means the
party in interest who is the source of authority for the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
improvement. One who deals with such a party directly
is contracting with the 'owner', and is not a subcontractor, but is an 'original contractor'. Albuquerque
Lumber Co. v. Tomei, 32 N.M. 5, 250 P. 21; Mitchell
v. McCutcheon, 33 N.M. 78, 260 P. 1086; Boyer v.
Keller, 258 Ill. 106, 101, N.E. 237, Ann. Cas. 1916B,
628; Builders' Supply & Coal Co. v. Eggmann, 190 Ill.
App. 572; Colorado Iron Works v. Rickenberg, 4 Idaho,
262, 38 P. 651; 18 R.C.L. 'Mechanics' Liens,' par. 39.
There was no error in the ruling complained of.'"
Freidenbloom vs Pecos Valley Lumber Company,
____________ N.M. ____________ , 290 P. 797, 798
"It means the party in interest who is the source
of authority for the improvement. One who deals with
such a party directly is contracting with the 'owner',
and is not a subcontractor, but is an 'original contractor'.
Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Tomei, 32 N.M. 5, 250
P. 21; Mitchell v. McCutcheon, 33 N.M. 78, 260 P.
1086; Boyer v. Keller, 258 Ill. 106, 101 N.E. 237,
Ann. Cas. 1916B, 628; Builders' Supply Co. v. Eggmann, 190 Ill. App. 572; Colorado Iron Works v.
Rickenberg, 5 Idaho, 262, 38 P. 651; 18 R.C.L. 'Mechanics' liens,' par. 39. There was no error in the
ruling complained of."
Colorado Iron Works vs. Rickenberg, 4 Idaho 262, 38
P. 651, 652
"Under the statutes of Idaho, any person contracting directly and exclusively with the owner, and between
whom and the contractor for the construction of the
structure there is neither relation of interest nor privity
of contract, is an original contractor, and as such has
the 60 days provided in the statute for the filing of his
notice of lien. In this construction we are in accord
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with the courts of many states having a statute almost
identical with ours. Matthews v. Association (Tex.
Sup.) 19 S.W. ISO; Hearne v. Railway Co., 53 Mo.
325; Bank v. Dashiell, 25 Grat. 616; Planing Mill Co.
v. Grams, 72 Wis. 275,89 N.W. 531; Phil. Mech. Liens,
Sec. 40-42; Jones, Liens, Sec. 1283."
Stark-Davis Co. v. Lansdon et al, ____________ Ore. ____________ ,
265 P. 792, the first Head Note of which is as follows:
"Materialman, installing furnace pursuant to negotiations with owner, HELD, as bearing on validity of lien
subsequently filed, an original contractor, though owner
had entered into a written contract with another for
construction of dwelling and furnishing of all material
therein."
36 Am. Jur. Mechanics' Liens, Par. 51,
follows:

IS

in part as

"CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS
DISTINGUISHED. -The principal contractor is one
standing in direct relation to the proprietor and responsible to him, permitted by the nature of his contract
ordinarily to work out the plan thereof by subletting
to others if he sees fit. He is the person who agrees with
the owner to construct a building upon the owner's
property. In order to constitute a lien claimant an
original contractor, there must exist or have existed a
contract, either express or implied, between such lien
Claimant and the owner of the property. One who
deals with the party in interest who is the source of
authority for the improvement directly is contracting
with the owner, and is not a subcontractor, but is an original contractor."
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In 57 CJS Sec. 57 at page 547, Mechanics Liens we
find the following:
"Under statutes so providing, the word 'owner'
includes every person for whose immediate use or
benefit the building, erection, or improvement is made.
Some courts, construing such statutes in connection with
other statutes deem an owner to be a person who owns
an interest in the land and for whose immediate use
and benefit the improvement is made."
and at page 547 we find the following:
"It has been held that the purpose of the statute
is to enlarge rather than limit the ordinary definition
of the word 'owner'. Under the latter construction a
person who owns both the building and the fee is an
owner regardless of whether or not the improvement is
made for his immediate benefit." (Italics added)
As to the term "Contractor" we find at page 602, section 90 of the same text it states that as used in mechanics'
lien statutes the term "contractor" has a restricted meaning.
A contractor, or principal contractor or original contrator,
within such statutes, is a person who contracts directly
with the owner of the property to erect or construct a building or other structure or improvement or any main division
or part thereof.
In Hinckley v. Fields Biscuit & Cracker Co., 91 Cal.
136, 27 P. 594 it is said:
"One holding the legal title to land, who enters
into a contract with the corporation to construct a factory
thereon under his directions, in consideration of a transfer to him before the erection of the building of a
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certain number of shares of its capital stock and agrees
to convey the building after its completion, together with
the land upon which it stood, to the company, is the
'owner' of the building and not a contractor within the
meaning of Code or Civ. Proc. Sec. 1183, relating to
mechanics' liens."
And in Grassi v Lovisa, 259 N.Y. 417, 182 NE 68,
Annotated in 83 ALR 1149 the court held a vendor of land
who has contracted for a consideration to convey the premises
to the vendee and thereafter to erect a building thereon, is
not a contractor for the improvement within the provisions
of the Mechanics' Lien Law.
We find from said case the following facts: Sherman
Square Studios Realty Corporation was the owner of prem·
ises in New York City. Sherman conveyed to a corporation
the premises which thereupon began the construction of a
building. Plaintiff Grassi furnished labor and materials for
plastering. Defendant Lovisa furnished labor and material for marble installation. They and others filed liens.
The court said:
"Sec. 2 of the New York Lien Laws says: 'The
term' contractor when used in this chapter, means a
person who enters into a contract with the owner of
real property for the improvement thereof."
It is to be noted this wording is very similar to our
Section 38-1-2.
In the above case the court further said in construing
this Section:
"The contractor whom the lien law has in view is
one who would be so characterized in the common
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speech of men. He is one who, in the usual course of
trade has undertaken to improve the property of another.
On its face, the agreement between Sherman and the
corporation was not a contract between general contractor and owner, for the corporation, when the contract was signed, did not then own the title to the premises, nor was it a vendee in possession under a contract
for the purchase of such real property. On the contrary,
the contract was one between vendor and purchaser
whereby, in addition to conveying the property, the
vendor agreed to make improvements thereupon for the
benefit and at the expense of the vendee. Thus when
the contract was made Sherman was still the owner, and
since it could not contract with itself, could not have
been a general contractor for the improvement." (Italics
added)
The above case is much stronger and goes much further
than the Court is required to go in the instant case. It appears that Coon was the fee title owner until April 25th, 1956,
the date of the deed from Coon to Trimble.
Fee title was vested in Coon during the whole of the
period of construction of the improvements. Each of the
lien claimants designated Coon as owner in their notices of
liens.
Coon being the owner with whom appellant contracted,
appellant was required to file its lien within 80 days from
its last delivery of materials. Section 38-1-7 UCA 1953
is mandatory in this requirement.
The Courts of Utah have so construed the above provision in Morris v Carey-Lombard Co. 9 Utah p. 70 at page
76 in which case the court speaking through Mr. Justice
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Bartch said of the provisions of the act approved March
I2, I890, Session Laws I890, sections IO and II:
"Every person claiming a lien must file the statement as provided in this section. This is indispensable
to preserve the lien provided for in the preceding sections, and section 11 provides that this statement shall
be filed within 60 days in case of the principal contractor, and within 40 days in case of a sub-contractor
in either degree after the time when the last work
shall have been done or the last material shall have
been furnished."
and at page 80 of the same case the court further says:
"After the work is completed or the materials are
furnished the lien may be lost by a failure to file the
statement provided in section IO within the time allowed
in section II, or by a failure to foreclose within the
time as limited in this act."
The above case is cited under our present Section 38-I-7
UCA I953, subdivision 4 at page 752, and is the law today.
The only question on this point raised by appellant
was that Coon was a contractor. The cases above cited
show as a matter of law that Coon was not a contractor.
There, therefore, is no genuine issue for trial as to this point.

II
WAIVER AND RELEASE
(a)-Parol Evidence:
Appellant executed a written release and lien waiver
for a valuable consideration which provided in part that the
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executing party "Waives, releases and discharges any lien
or right to lien the undersigned has or may hereafter acquire
against said real property." The instrument is unambiguous
in all respects. Appellant is attempting to vary the terms
thereof by parol evidence. It is elementary that this cannot
be done. Appellant would not be in position to introduce
evidence at a trial that appellant's intent was other and different from the unambiguous language of the written instrument.
20 Am. Ju.r. 964 under the title evidence, Section 1102
provides:
"The intention of the parties as evidenced by the
legal import of the language of the written contract
cannot be varied by parol proof of a different intention, in the absence of some equitable ground for intervention, such as mistake, fraud, or surprise. Parol evidence is not admissible to show the intention of a party
as to the character of an instrument which is so plain
and unambiguous that its meaning can be ascertained
from reading it. Hence, testimony of a party to a contract as to how he understood it is inadmissible. Testimony as to what the witnesses understood from conversations with the parties, as to the contract between them,
cannot be received to contradict the written contract."
There is a long list of cases cited in support of the above
proposition including Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 U. 233, 63 P.

888, 54 L.R.A. 354.
20 Am. Jur. 973 provides:
"The admissibility of parol evidence in the case of
a receipt has been conditioned on ambiguity: the view
is that if the receipt is definitely descriptive of what i5
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intended to be affected by it, it cannot be assailed by
parol testimony except on the ground of fraud."
"In the absence of fraud or mistake, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary, add to, or
subtract from the terms of a valid written instrument.
Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co., Inc., 82 Utah
279, 17 P 2nd 294, 90 A.L.R. 1299; Last Chance
Ranch Co. V. Erickson, 82 U. 475, 25 P 2nd 952."
(b) ESTOPPEL
In 36 Am. Jur. on Mechanic's Liens, Section 221 under
the subject of Estoppel we find the following statement:
"Under the general principles of estoppel, the right
to a mechanic's lien may be waived or lost by a course
of conduct on the part of the lien holder which would
render it inequitable for him to assert a lien."
at section 230 it is said:
"A contractor, by agreeing with the owner to keep
the property free from mechanics' liens, and, a fortiori,
by agr.eeing to assert no lien, precludes himself from
claiming a lien, and the right to a lien is not revived by
the failure of the owner to make payment as agreed."
In Van Dyck Heating & Plumbing Co. v Central Iowa
Bldg. Co. 2000 Iowa, 1003, 205 N.W. 650, 102 ALR page
356, holding that a contractor was not entitled to assert a
mechanic's lien, the court said:
"A mechanic's lien is a right or privilege given to
a contractor to protect himself against loss for material
and labor furnished. It is wholly a creature of statute.
We know of no reason, and none has been urged, which
would prevent the contractor from waiving such a lien.
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In this instance where, by the contract, the contrator
waived all liens and claims to liens to which he was
entitled by statute by reason of work done or to be done.
The waiver was perfectly clear and unambiguous in
every respect."
The above case has been followed In numerous JUrisdictions.
In Hyde Park lnv. Co. v
Ill. App. 539 it was held that
mechanic's liens where he had
valuable consideration express
of labor or materials or both
furnished."

Hyde Park State Bank, 257
a contractor could not assert
executed and delivered for a
waivers of liens "on account
furnished or which may he

And in Kertscher v Oreon 205 NY 522, 99NE 146.
Ann.Cas. 1913E 561 the court said:
"No good reason can be suggested why a contractor
cannot for a valuable consideration, waive the provisions of the statute giving him the right to file a
notice of lien."
(c) THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE LIEN WAIVER ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The legal effect of the lien waiver is a genuine issue in
this case. It is not an issue of fact, however. The facts are
clear. Appellant cannot seriously contend that parol evidence is admissable to vary the terms of this written instrument by showing that one party to the transaction intended
that the instrument should not have the legal effect that is
obvious upon its face. This issue is, therefore, an issue of
law. The appellant, for a valuable consideration, agreed
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to waive, release and discharge any lien or right to a lien
which it had or which it might thereafter acquire. Appellant
cannot now change the agreement by saying it intended it to
have a different effect nor can appellant effectively claim that
by doing so an issue of fact is created.
The case of Ulibarri V. Christenson, 2 Utah 2nd 367,
275 P 2nd 170, cited by appellant as authority for its position that a summary judgment should not be granted where
there is a genuine issue of fact, correctly states the law with
respect to this matter. In that case, motion for summary
judgment based upon a release was granted even though the
release was assailed on the grounds of ( 1 ) ambiguity, ( 2) ·
failure of consideration, and ( 3) voidness because of fraud
and duress, the Court holding there was no genuine issue of
fact. In this case appellant was given every opportunity
to show why the lien waiver was not, as respondents contend,
a waiver of lien right which appellant might thereafter acquire. Appellant's only defense is that it intended that the
agreement not be a release of lien rights which might be
acquired in the future contrary to the unambiguous wording of the instrument. Assuming for the moment that defendants actually did so intend, it would not be sufficient
to change the legal effect of the lien waiver. In sustaining
the lower Court's order granting summary judgment in the
Ulibarri V. Christenson case, supra, the Supreme Court at
page 371 observed:
"The trial court having afforded the plaintiff a
fair opportunity to make any representations she could
which might overcome the release, and having determined as a matter of law that her claims, even if proved,
would not meet the legal requisites necessary to do so,
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he correctly granted the motion for summary judgment."
The conclusion is inescapable. Appellant waived its
right to acquire a future lien for services or materials
furnished on this property. Appellant is estopped and summary judgment was properly granted against appellant.
CONCLUSION
Coon was an owner-builder. The cases cited herein
show that the law is clear that under our lien law such a
person is an "owner" and not a "contractor". Apparently
notice of lien was not, therefore, filed in time.
Furthermore, if a notice of lien had been filed timely,
appellant has no lien because appellant executed a release
for a consideration whereby it "hereby waives, releases and
discharges any lien or right to lien the undersigned has or
may hereafter acquire against said real property".
For both reasons herein stated, respondents should prevail.
Respectfully submitted,

M. V. BACKMAN

JOHN FAR LARSON

JOHN W. LOWE
Attorneys for Respondents
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